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The Korean military organization has been organized and largely sustained by
the loyalty and patriotism of its members. However, improvements in the economy
may create future military manpower problems.
The implementation of high technology improvements in weaponry and tactics
also will impact on these emerging problems, as the military services will need to
recruit and retain even-higher quality personnel. To assure that these requirements are
met, and to compete with pay increases in the private sector, constructive changes in
Korean military compensation policies may be required.
To address this issue, this research examines the current compensation policies in
the context of military-civilian comparisons and obtains the views of Korean officer
students at the Naval Postgraduate School. The results of these efforts provide the
basis for identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
Today, as aircraft become more modern and powerful, the significance of air
combat readiness for national defense is more critical than ever before. The latest wars
have shown its critical significance. The results effect every country trying to increase
its air combat readiness level through improvements in human resources and weapons
systems.
However, because of economic, technological and human resource constraints, it
may not be possible for every country to acquire the desired improvements.
Accordingly, a country must find the most efficient and effective way to increase total
air combat readiness under such constraints.
The degree to which a country can improve its human resources and weapons
systems in large measure depends on economic growth. In Korea, for example,
economic growth has been largely stimulated by export demand. Without natural
resources, Korea has been going through a major transformation from dependence
upon labor-intensive industries to concentration on capital-intensive industries,
including the steel industry and ship-building.
The benefits from this growth have spread throughout Korean society, and
family income in both urban and rural areas has benefited equally. In addition, there
has been the development of a middle class and an expansion of high school education
opportunities. These increased educational opportunities, in particular, have served to
increase social equality and economic advancement. [Ref. 1: p. 5]
Nevertheless, in terms of overall military capability, South Korea currently is
inferior to North Korea. (See Table 1).
In the future, however, the goal is to achieve military parity based on strong
economic growth, and to accomplish this, it is clear that Korea must consider an
increased defense effort. While the allocation of resources to the military will mean a
reduction in funds for non-military programs, the one factor that dominates Korean
society is the threat of aggression by North Korea. Therefore, Korea has been willing
to accept heavy defense expenditures, which are now about 6 percent of GNP.
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-TABLE 1




Total armed forces 622,000 785,000
- Army 540.000 700,000
- Navy 49,000 34.000
- Air Force 33,000 51,000
Para- Military forces 5,780,000 5,170,000
EQUIPMENT
Army
- Artillery 2.800 5,300
- Tank 1,200 3,200
- Armored Vehicle SOO 1,200
Navy
- Submarine 21
- Destrover 20 2
- Total naval vessel 101 537
Air Force
- Bomber and Fighter 450 740
- Transport 61 369
- Total A/C 618 1322
* Source: Adapted from "!South and North Korea in Graphic
Representation" pp. 59-60, National Unification
Board, Republic of Korea.
Today, the Korean military force is critical to the deterrence of North Korean
aggression, and it plays a major role in the country's stability. Because all young
citizens are subject to performing the sacred duty 1 of national defense, the military is
providing a major pool of technology-oriented and trained workers for industry.
In the Air Force, for example, technology applied to weaponry and tactics has
required more high-quality pilots, engineers and computer programmers than ever
before, and many of these citizens have subsequently applied their skills in civilian jobs.
It is clear, therefore, that parallel growth in the economy and the defense establishment
are mutually supportive, and essential to Korean success in the internationally
competitive society to be faced in the future. In terms of achieving such growth,
*The Constitution of the Republic of Korea Article 34 "All citizens should have
the duty to defend the national territory in accordance with the provisions of law"
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Sneider" has suggested three possible scenarios for the future military posture of Korea:
[Ref. 1: pp. 44-45].
First scenario is a continuation of the present policv with the defense budget
representing approximately 6 percent of GNP.
Second scenario would involve a higher defense budget than 6 percent of GNP
and increased manpower ceilings, but with only limited utilization of higher
technology and weapons systems.
The third scenario would involve a pronounced shift to high technologv weapons
systems, accompanied by lower manpower ceilings, in the range o'f a 25-40
percent force reduction.
In the view of Sneider and key Korean government leaders, and as illustrated in
Figure 1.2, the third scenario appears to be the most suitable to the future military
structure of Korea. This judgement will prove to be correct, however, only if the
following conditions can be met:
(1) The increased military budget will be absorbed within a balanced budget,
given the expected annual real growth of 7-9 percent.
(2) Sufficient funds for capital investment and stimulation of economic
development will still be available.
(3) A reduction in manpower of 30-40 percent will bring a reduction in operation
and maintenance costs greater than the increased cost of high technology
weapons systems.
In addition, as the economic gap between South and North Korea grows larger,
as shown in Figure 1.1, North Korea might decide to reconsider its present belligerent
policies and accept a real reduction of tensions. South Korea would thereby have less
need to increase its military effort.
In the meantime, however, Sneider worries that North Korea might consider an
attack against South Korea before the economic gap 3 grows larger and their current
military advantage is lost.
Accordingly, as Korea President Chun has emphasized "the next 2-3 years are
the most important period". If Korea can endure the next 2-3 years, then it can
become an advanced industrial nation without a significant threat of North Korean
aggression.
































1 970 1 975
Figure 1.1 GNP in South and North Korea.
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As Figure 1.2 illustrates, point A represents the current level of military
expenditures. To increase armed readiness of war from Rj to R2 budget allocation
should shift from point A to point B, a move which represents new weapons systems
accompanied by lower manpower ceilings, the policy option which represents an
optimal allocation of resources for deterring North Korean aggression.
Within the context of economic growth and both technological improvements
and manpower reduction in the armed forces, one of the major concerns will be the
military's capacity to maintain adequate levels of manpower, of sufficient quality, and
at a reasonable cost, to perform its role effectively. This question is particularly
important because of recent changes in the educational system and the civilian labor
force.
To help policy makers address this concern, this research will examine current
military compensation policies with a view toward identifying and recommending the
most appropriate compensation policies for the Korean military by the year 2000. In
particular, this research will investigate the pecuniary compensation policies for
officers.
However, as retention rates are classified, this research has been limited to
examination of available information on Korean Air Force policies. In addition,
Korean officers at Naval Postgraduate School (NTS) have been surveyed for their
opinions on military compensation policies. This research expects to provide a good
foundation for improved human resource management in the quest for maximum air
combat effectiveness. Hopefully, the study results will provide both guidance and
useful recommendations for better manpower management.
B. CHARACTER OF MILITARY SERVICE
Understanding the character of military service in Korea is helpful when
developing an improved compensation program.
Whereas economic growth, industrial expansion and increases in income and
living standards have taken place, the nature of Korean military service as an
institution has not changed.
An institution is a well-established and structured pattern of behavior of
relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of the culture. Its purpose
transcends individual self-interest in favor of a higher good. Members of an
institution are often viewed as following a calling. Similarlv, militarv leaders
point out, individuals joining a militarv" service take an oath of office to the
nation and accept a wav of life" rather than simply accepting a job. To
encourage commitment, the military places a high value on the welfare of its










Note : Define Terms in Graph.
M = 60,000 troops
M
n
= Reduced end strength
W = Current technology weapon capability
WQ = Increased technology weapon capability
Ri = Current Readiness level &. illustrates a less than
optimal resource allocation
R<2 = Improved Readiness level & illustrates optimal resource
* allocation
Max Readiness = f (Manpower Requirement, Weapon Capability)
subject to Constraint of 6 percent of GNP
Figure 1.2 Maximization of Readiness for Given Military Budget.
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Military service in Korea has many institutional aspects. The basic purpose of
the military forces is to defend the national territory and to engage in combat when
called upon. Military personnel cannot unilaterally decide their retirement at any time
they choose. They are willing to give up their lives if necessary for their country and
they often work more than civilians without overtime pay. They must obey orders
without question. Their actions are regulated by the military law under which they can
be prosecuted for crimes unique to the military, such as disobedience and absence
without permission [Ref. 2: p. 7].
Traditionally, conditions of military service such as wartime risks, frequent
moves, family separations, field, sea or flying duty, and extended duty hours best
explains the character of military service.
C. COMPENSATION SYSTEM
Military compensation policies are complex and have received increasing
attention in recent years, when economic growth has been stable and society has
become more economically competitive.
Compensation can be defined as all forms of financial returns and tangible
services and benefits received as part of an employment relationship. An individual's
perception of the compensation package greatly impacts on the job choice decision.
How much compensation is adequate to attract and retain qualified personnel is a vital
issue for both the military and civilian sectors. To compete with pay increases in the
private sector, the military must continuously examine existing compensation policies.
As employees, they may consider their own compensation as a return on their
investment in education and training. For most of them, the pay they receive for the
work they perform is the major source of personal wealth; hence, it is an important
determinant of their economic and social well-being. [Ref. 3: pp. 500-501]
Korean military compensation consists of pay, allowances and many
supplemental benefits. All military personnel receive basic pay, which is the same for
individuals working in the same specialty in the same pay grade and with the same
time in service. Quarters and semiannual allowances are paid to all military personnel
in the same pay grade and same time in service. However, allowances can vary
depending on such factors as pay-grade, occupational specialty-rate, marital status,
time in service, number of dependents, duty assignment, and intentions of making a
career in the military. Necessities such as housing, food, uniforms and medical care are
16
provided either directly or in the form of allowances or coupons. And a large portion
of military compensation is deferred; that is, retirement benefits are accrued and paid
to persons leaving military service, depending upon their years of service.
The Korean government has a plan to increase public employee pay by 7 percent
in the year 1987. Because public employees (including military) are paid only about 65
percent of civilian pay, 60 percent of all public employee are receiving pay that is less
than the standard urban cost of living. [Ref. 4]
In the area of increasing wages for the public employee work force, several key
questions need to be addressed. For example, what standard should be used to
measure pay adjustments? Also, should specific principles be adopted? For example,
principles could direct policy makers to:
-provide an acceptable standard of living.
-allow for management flexibility.
-have a predictable adjustment mechanism.
-distinguish between levels of responsibility.
-be acceptable to military personnel.
-support and preserve the hierarchical military structure.
-be equitable.
-minimize pay differentials among people of equal rank and service time.
-be fully visible to service members and the public.
-recognize differing working conditions.
-reward superior performance. [Ref. 2: p. 25]
D. APPROACH TO MILITARY COMPENSATION
The purpose of the military compensation system is to attract, retain and
motivate the number and quality of personnel needed to maintain the desired level of
national security.
Military compensation can be premised primarily on institutional considerations;
that is, it is governed greatly by traditional military oriented social and cultural values.
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It also can be premised more on market considerations and less on traditional military
oriented values. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
Therefore, two competing schools of thought were apparent in the research
literature on how military' compensation levels should be determined and structured:
the institutional and the market approaches [Ref. 2: p. 13].
1. Institutional Approach
The Institutional Approach views the military compensation system as a key
tool for enhancing the relationship between the military and its personnel. Individuals
of the same grade and seniority are viewed as equally important to the military mission
regardless of the occupational specialty to which they are assigned. All military jobs
are considered equally important.
To develop desired cohesiveness, unity of purpose, and reciprocal loyalty, job
differences are subordinated to this common expectation. Although some differential
pays are accepted in practice as necessary to staff the force, this approach believes that
such differences should be minimized. [Ref. 2: p. 14]
2. Market Approach
Those who favor the Market Approach believe the institutional approach is
inefficient, and compensation policies to affect accessions and retention should be
evaluated in terms of supply and demand; that is, personal and compensation policies
should be viewed as mechanisms for obtaining the desired force structure at least cost.
The market approach thinks an individual is more likely to base decisions to
join or remain in a military service on the level of military compensation relative to
that available in alternative civilian employment. To minimize total personnel costs,
they contend that competitive pay levels should be set and adjusted by occupation
based on supply and demand conditions in the job market. [Ref. 2: p. 15]
Currently, in Korea, military compensation policies have been largely
influenced by the institutional view. But, over the years, policy changes have
increasingly reflected the influence of the market approach.
As noted earlier, Korea's future military posture and economic growth will
focus defense efforts on high technology weapon systems accompanied by lower
manpower ceilings. To attract the higher quality persons needed by the military to
achieve these goals, it is likely that further changes in compensation policies will be
necessary. Yet, it is unlikely that the pure market approach will be adopted. Vestiges
of the institutional approach are likely to be present for the foreseeable future.
18
Nevertheless, economic necessity dictates that market supply and demand factors will
be the driving force in future compensation policy changes.
E. IMPACT OF MARKET APPROACH
The likely emphasis in future compensation decisions of the market approach will
reflect a clear relationship with known economic laws, in particular, the law of supply,
which states that the quantity supplied of a product usually varies directly with its
price, assuming that all other things remain the same. In other words, if the military is
willing to pay for higher quality recruits, more high quality recruits will select military
careers over civilian careers.
The Korean young generation must perform a period of national defense duty in
either an officer or non-officer status. If they want to serve as an officer, they can
enter officer procurement programs such as the academy or university (including
ROTC). Academy graduates have an option to serve for 10 years, while University
graduates only serve for 3 years (ROTC for 2 years). After completing their duty, if
they decide to remain in the military, we call them career military personnel.
As mentioned in the previous section, today's young generation tends to select
occupations which can guarantee the most income. In addition to the influence of
income, factors affecting such decisions are young generation tastes, prospects for
economic growth and middle class opportunities. At present, these all have combined
to decrease the supply of high quality personnel to the military.
As shown in Figure 1.3, if current military compensation remains the same,
which is characterized by a 40 percent differential between military and civilian pay, the
supply curve of high quality people wishing to remain in the military will be shifting
downward. If, however, as illustrated in Figure 1.4, the Korean military is able to
combine this supply curve decrease with a reduction in the manpower ceiling and more
technical weapons systems, we prompt movement from Qq to Qj .
Although the current compensation gap between military and civilian personnel
is not changing, there will be an increasing shortage of career officers, as shown as a
gap between Q1Q3 on the supply curve Sj . To overcome this projected shortage, we
must increase military compensation to Cj in order to recruit and retain high quality
people for military careers.
In conclusion, the problem of future shortages in high quality officers can be
overcome through changes in compensation levels. To this end, we will explore what

















Note : Define terms in Graph.
Q = Demand Curve of High Quality people
S Q = Old Supply Curve of High Quality people
Sj = New Supply Curve of High Quality people in a future
C^ = Current level at present compensation rates
Cd = Compensation level necessarv to maintain present levels of high
quality people after decrease' in Supply






Note : Define terms in Graph.
Q = present Manning level
Qi = Number desired under scenario 3
Q3 = Number available manning level at present compensation rates
C Q = Current compensation level
Ci = Compensation level necessary to achieve Qj
Figure 1.4 Demand and Supply Curve of Officer.
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II. MILITARY TO CIVILIAN PAY COMPARISON
This chapter compares military pay to civilian pay. Whereas no data exists
which would allow an exact comparison of military and private sector compensation
for personnel with the same levels of work experience, the level of accuracy supports
general conclusions.
A. THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARISON
1
.
Views of Compensation Differ
The military and the private sector differ in the way they view compensation.
Although movement to the Market Approach is occuring, the military currently
emphasizes an "Institutional Approach" viewing individuals of the same grade and
seniority as equally important to the military defense mission, regardless of the
occupational specialty to which they are assigned. Accordingly, military compensation
is based primarily on grade and years of service. Occupational differences are taken
into account through special duty allowances for those occupations in which risk and
specialty problems exist.
In contrast, civilian compensation is more likely to be based on the "Market
Approach" where labor supply and demand for a particular occupation are more
important determinants of the amount of compensation that a particular occupation
will receive at any given time [Ref. 5: p. 2].
2. Cost of Living Variation
The cost of living, and therefore real salary levels, are significantly affected by
geographical location, population, tax policies, and the availability of health insurance
and social welfare benefits.
The concepts of nominal income and real income also must be distinguished.
For example, a person living in Seoul and another person living in Daejeon may have
identical nominal income, yet the cost of living in Daejeon is lower than in Seoul.
Thus, those in Daejeon have a much higher real income.
The same concept can be applied to military and civilian comparisons. A
military person may receive the equivalent of X dollars annually, but the civilian, his
counterpart, really earns less in terms of real income, because military fringe benefits
are considerably more generous than civilian benefits (Military fringe benefits exceed
civilian benefits largely because of the greater value of military retirement).
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3. Differences in Mission and Productivity
No civilian firms have missions comparable to the military. Further, military
life has the "X-Factor" which refers to the hardships and unusual demands of military
service which are not normally found in civilian employment.
During peacetime, the military protects the territory and maintains the force
of deterrence toward North Korean aggression, while the mission and productivity in
the civilian sector are directly related to and primarily concerned with profits. Civilians
can easily transfer to another occupation, whereas the military cannot.
B. COMPARISON
1. Assumption and Limitation
The following assumptions and limitations are made in studying pay
comparability. Military compensation data was obtained from a 1986 standard pay
table prepared by the Korean Air Force Headquarters.
Civilian data was obtained from the 1985 Year Book, published by the
Department of Labor. Some data has been modified. For example, it is assumed that
the 1986 increasing rate of income will be 5.5 percent, and that University Graduate
monthly income will be 596,9 174 Won. It is also assumed that civilian workers have
never experienced periods of unemployment.
Pay grade and corresponding ranks are shown in Table 2. [Refs. 6,7] All
subsequent discussion of pay grades and ranks are based on Table 2.
Military pay does not include income tax deductions or any other kinds of
income deduction. It is assumed that all officers will be commissioned at age 24. Only
cash compensation of military and civilian personnel of the same levels of age and
experience will be compared.
In comparing Korean entitlements, corresponding U.S. military entitlements
will be matched as closely as possible. The occupations of clerk (CLK), engineer and
jet pilot will be analyzed. Family subsidies will be calculated based on two children.
Housing allowances will not be calculated.
4 1984 Univ. Graduate Male Avg income 534,411 Won. 1985 Univ. Graduate
Male Avg income 564,800 Won ( 5.6% increase).
5Since Korean educational system 6-3-3-4 they enter primary school at age 7.
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•TABLE 2
PAY GRADE AND RANK
Pay Grade Rank(Air Force)
0-1 So-Wi (Second Lieutenant)
0-2 Jung-Wi (First Lieutenant)
0-3 Dai-Wi (Captain)
0-4 So-Ryung (Major)
0-5 Jung-Ryung (Lieutenant Colonel)
0-6 Dae-Ryung (Colonel)
2. Data
To obtain an average wage level for each month of service, earnings were
defined to include basic pay, general allowances and special allowances. Some
military officers receive additional7 allowances. The list of allowances is found in Table
3.
For civilians, average incomes are different depending on occupation, as
shown in Figure 2.1. [Refs. 9,10] The highest paying civilian industry is industry 7
(Financing, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Service) which is well above the 1985
All industry average monthly income.
3. Comparison
The purpose of this subsection is to compare military salaries with civilian
salaries for three specific occupations: clerks, engineers and jet pilots. The analysis is
independent of other factors such as desire for military service, perceived opportunities
in and out of the military and personal considerations which may influence job choice.
This analysis is for the purpose of example only and should not be considered absolute.
6See Appendix A
' See Appendix B for detailed allowances.
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TABLE 3
LIST OF ALLOWANCES PAY
General Allowances Special Duty Allowances
Quarters Allowance Technical Allowance
Semiannual Allowance Flight Duty Allowance
Family Subsidy Allowance for Hazardous
Continuation Allowance Allowance for Legal, Religion, Medical
Activity Allowance Allowance for Instructor
Incentive Allowance for Specialty
*Source: Adapted from Korean Air Force Field Manual 35-1
"Personnel Management" pp. 40-41.
Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show the clerk, engineer and jet pilots, monthly pay
profile based on the 1986 pay scale. The income is the monthly amount of
compensation a military officer would receive at a given year of service, assuming due
course promotion.
As shown in Figure 2.2, military CLK monthly income surpasses 1986
University Graduate average income(86 UG AVG INCOME) after 9 years of
commissioned service. (Civilian CLK monthly income surpasses 86 UG AVG
INCOME within 6-7 years from graduation) [Ref. 8: p. 538]. In Figure 2.3, we see that
military Engineer monthly income surpasses 86 UG AVG INCOME after 8 years of
commissioned service.
As Figure 2.4 illustrates, military Pilot monthly income surpasses 86 UG AVG
INCOME after 3 years from commission.
As shown in Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, officers are compensated quite well, but
their incomes lag behind that of 1986 average income for those with Bachelor' degrees
for the first 8-9 years (except jet pilot).
Figure 2.5 compares clerk's income in the civilian and the military sector. The
income of clerks by age-groups is depicted; military income is developed in the same







85 ALL INDUSTRY AVG
INDUSTRY
•Note: 1. Mining 2. Manufacturing 3. Electricitv, Gas & Water
4. Construction 5. Wholesale Retail Trade Restaurants & Hotel
6. Transport, Storage & Communication
7. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Service
8. Community Social &. Personal Service
Figure 2.1 85 Average Monthly Wage by Industry.
1985 data in order to correspond to the military data. As shown in Figure 2.5, military
income lags behind that of the civilian sector through the ages of 30-34, where military
income surpasses civilian income. Military income does not equal the average of
civilian clerk, income until 6-7 years after graduation from the university.
The result of this comparison raises the question at which year veterans, once
they have completed their duty, can catch up to the average income in all civilian
occupations? When they decide either to continue military service or to take up
civilian employment, they consider income along with many other factors. Yet, as
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Figure 2.5 Clerk Monthly Income Comparison by Age.
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TABLE 4





Value of Job 4.3
Work-hour 2.0
Don't know 1.5
*Source : adapted from survey
[Ref. 11: p. 36].
by Korea Manager Association in
To better illustrated this situation, salaries from an actual company are
presented. Kuk Dong Construction company was chosen because of availability of
data. As shown in Table 5, a military veteran, with bachelor' degree, who completed
his duty may start as a M-l at age 27.
As shown in Figure 2.6, the range of M-l salaries are slightly greater than
those for military officers with 4 years of service. The range of salaries in Figure 2.6
for each management grade seems to be dependent on performance, not position or
tenure at the company. Considering their bonus, income differential may be increased.
According to a survey by Korea Manager Association, M-l start at age 27 and it takes
an average 3.9 years to promote to M-3. Also it takes average 3.7 years from M-3 to
M-4, 3.6 years from M-4 to M-5 and 3.7 years from M-5 to M-6. It takes an average
15 years from M-l to M-6. Figure 2.6 shows military income equivalents with all level
of managers, by age. The median starting salary7 of a civilian counterpart are greater
than those of military, and pay differentials are growing bigger year to year.
[Ref. 11: p. 36].
Of course, whether military income is greater or not than civilian income will
depend upon the size and type of company, and it is not known whether the illustrated




MANAGEMENT CHART, KUK DONG CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD
(Unit: Won) 31 May, 1986
Grade Name
Hoi-Jang







M-5 Cha-Jang 759,000 3
M-4 Gua-Jang 655,000 3
M-3 Dae-Ri 545,000 2
M-2 Ju-Im 480,000 2
M-l Sa-Won 365,000 2
*Note : All managers' salaries do not include bonuses which are
correspondingly quarter and semiannual allowances in the military.
According toTersonnel Regulations, thev receive regular bonuses
4 times per year and a special bonus depending on profits.
[Ref. 10: p. 8.3]
Figure 2.6 also raises a question about compensation based on the
responsibility and difficulty of each position in civilian and military organizations. This
question will be discussed in a later chapter.
C. SUMMARY
The general conclusion drawn from data is that for the majority of their careers,
military officers receive less than their civilian counterparts until about the 10th year
after commissioning.
Military income lags behind civilian income by approximately 2-3 years as shown
in Figure 2.6. However, military officers can look forward to an accelerated growth of
annual compensation in later years, a growth not enjoyed by civilians. After 3 years of
duty, the officers can leave the military to work for the civilian sector. At this point,
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*Note : These markings do not represent the pay line to be received bv
a cohort eroup graduating m same year, but rather thev graduated
at various timesln the past.
Figure 2.6 Monthly Military7 Clerk Income vs Level of Management.
In accordance with traditional economic theory, the pay differentials between
civilian and military are likely to be having a negative impact on the recruitment of
high quality candidates for the academy cadet program, and retention of military
officers with high technical experience who have graduated from a civilian university.
In addition, it is clear that civilian employers prefer military officers with
experience and are willing to pay a premium to get them. This is mainly because the
military provides more management training and experience than civilian employers.
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III. VIEWS OF KOREAN NPS STUDENT OFFICERS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a results of the survey of Korean
students at the NPS. The survey was undertaken in order to obtain information which
could support policy formation and research necessary for dealing with present and
future Korean military compensation issues. The data includes information about the
behavior, attitudes, preferences, and intentions of military personnel, assesses the
response of officers to current compensation policies, and identifies possible areas for
future compensation policy changes.
This survey was conducted on 1 September through 30 September, 1986.
Questionnaires were extracted and modified for the Korean students from a 1978 DoD
survey. [Ref. 12]
A. SURVEY DOCUMENT
1. Structure and Contents
The survey document is displayed in Appendix C.
Section I, BACKGROUND (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6), collected basic data such
as service, rank, respondent's source of commission, years of service (YOS), current age
and martial status when surveyed.
Section II, MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM (Q7,Q8,Q9,Q10), assessed
the respondent's future orientation by asking his knowledge of retirement benefits,
choice of his retirement pay, expected years of service and expected rank at discharge.
Section III, MILITARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
(Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14,Q15,Q16), collected judgements concerning total pay, basic pay
and allowances. This section also determined the respondent's valuation of medical
services. In addition, it was designed to collect data about the respondent's housing.
Section IV, CIVILIAN JOB SEARCH (Q17,Q18,Q19), collected data about
the respondent's civilian labor market experience and potential civilian earnings.
Additionally, each questionnarie measured respondent's views concerning comparative
condition, between military and civilian occupations (Q20,Q21,Q22). Furthermore,
there are questions on promotion prospects, reasons for entering the military, and
overall satisfaction with military life.
32
2. Limitations and Assumptions
The respondents were Korean officer students at NPS. The objective of the
survey, terminology, and how to complete the survey were personally explained to each
respondent prior to completing the survey. Respondents' replies were based on what
they thought were the best answers to questions. Survey questions were designed with
the assumption that constructive changes in Korean military compensation policies can
help to overcome problems of recruiting and retention of high quality people.
Consideration was given to the whole sample: their duty station and housing
was based on their last station in Korea, and their ranks were as of 1 September 1986.
The respondents are divided into two groups: Junior (02-03) and Senior (04-05).
Respondents answered each question by selecting one of four or more available
answers.
B. RESULTS OF SURVEY
SPSSX was utilized to compile the results of the survey in figures and tables,
contained herein. The results of key quesions from each survey section are provided in
this section. Remaining questions' results may be found in Appendix D. Data
provided by respondents is presented, discussed and compared. However, the emphasis
of this section is purposely limited to a presentation of the compiled data without the
possible inferences that could be drawn from the information. In the next, and final
section, the author analyzes the results and develops a conclusion based upon the
findings provided by the survey questionnaires.
1. Background Data Analysis
Sixty eight of 69 surveys distributed were completed. Most of the surveys
indicated that the respondents are concerned with current compensation policies. All
respondents completed every question (there are no missing values).
Branch, rank, YOS, age and martial status profiles are displayed in Figures 3.1
thorough 3.5.
2. Military Retirement System
As shown in Figure 3.6, most respondents (80.9 %) had a general knowledge
of retirement benefits. Only one individual had specific knowledge of all retirement
benefits. If the "general knowledge'' respondents knew more about the specifics of the
retirement benefit, the result might be higher member satisfaction. The responses were
not significantly different by rank or service.
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VALID CUM
VALUE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
ARMY 1 32 47.1 47.1 47.1
NAVY 2 12 17.6 17.6 64.7
AIR FORCE 3 24 35.3 35.3 100.0
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VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
TOTAL
2 2 2.9 2.9 2.9
3 22 32.4 32.4 35.3
4 42 61 .8 61 .8 97.1
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Figure 3.2 Respondents by Rank.
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Figure 3.3 Respondents by YOS.





























TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
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Figure 3.4 Respondents by Age.
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Figure 3.5 Respondents by Martial Status.
VALID CUM
VALUE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
NOT AT ALL 1 12 17.6 17.6 17.6
GENERALLY 2 55 80.9 80.9 98.5
SPECIFICALLY 3 1 1.5 1.5 100.0


















Figure 3.6 Knowledge of Retirement Benefit.
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As shown in Figure 3.7, the majority of personnel (72 %) chose annuity as the
desired method of retirement payment. Four respondents (5.9 %) selected annuity but
by a mixed annuity and lump-sum ("other") method.
As shown in Figure 3.8, the overwhelming majority (94.1 %) expected to stay
longer than 20 years.
3. Military compensation and Benefits
As shown in Figure 3.9, respondents were split as to the comparison of their
pay with the civilian sector. Fifty-one percent found their pay equal to or
greaterf'some extent" to "very great extent") than their civilian counterparts, while 48
percent of respondents believed their pay to be slightly less. By groups, the Junior
Group believed their pay to be a little less (45.8%) while the Senior group believed
their pay to be equal to or greater than civilian pay, as shown in Appendix E.
Most respondents (60.3%) were dissatisfied with their basic pay, as shown in
Figure 3.10. By groups, the Junior Group was more dissatisfied than the Senior Group
with basic pay (See Appendix E). However, sixty percent of respondents were satisfied
with the military bonus system (Figure 3.11).
As shown in Figure 3.12, 67.6 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied
with their general allowances. By groups, as shown in Appendix E, the Senior Group
(70.5 %) was more dissatisfied than the Junior Group (62.5 %).
Figure 3.13 shows that fifty-six percent of the respondent indicated
dissstisfaction with their special allowances. By groups, the Junior group responded
dissatisfaction at a 53 percent rate, as indicated in Appendix E.
Approximately forty-six percent of respondents indicated dissatisfaction with
supplemental benefits (See Figure 3.14). By groups, the Junior Group was more
satisfied with supplemental benefits than the Senior Group, as shown in Appendix E.
In general, respondents seemed to be more satisfied with bonus and
supplemental benefits than basic pay, special allowances or general allowances. By
groups, the Senior Group was more satisfied with the above five categories except
general allowances. For general allowances the Junior Group was more satisfied.
As shown in Figure 3.15, respondents ranked their preferences for changing
toward higher satisfaction, as follows: primary special allowances (30.9%), basic pay
(23.5%) and general allowances (23.5%), supplemental benefits (14.7%) and bonus







VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 15 22.1 22.1 22.1
2 49 72.1 72.1 91.1
3 4 5.9 5.9 100.0
TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
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Figure 3.7 Mil. Retirement Preference.
VALID CUM
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-REQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
A VERY LITTLE 1 8 11.8 11 .8 11.8
A LITTLE 2 25 36. a 36.8 48.5
A SOME 3 29 42.6 42.6 91 .2
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Figure 3.13 Mil. Compensation : Special Allowance.


























































































































































Figure 3.15 Compensation Policy Preference.
4. Civilian Job Search
The intent of these questions was to determine what set of military job
conditions were preferred to civilian job conditions and the extent to which preferences
of job condition existed. The data clearly indicated that respondents consider the
















As shown in Figure 3.16, eighteen percent of the responses indicated that the
civilian sector was better than the military sector, when asked about comparison of
supervision. A 3 x 5 matrix is presented in Appendix E which portrays the
relationships between the branch of service and level of preference. Chi square tests
are also applied to determine the significance of row and column' independence. Chi
square indicates the frequencies are significant beyond the .05 level.
C. SUMMARY
The respondents indicated the following reasons for joining the military in order
of preference(Q21): Pride of serving in the armed forces (30.9%), promotion prospects
(20.6%), patriotism (14.7%), education benefit (13.2%) and monetary compensation
(13.2%). Thirteen percent of respondents were dissatisfied with military life, but 64.7
percent of respondents were satisfied. Further, the Senior Group felt greater
satisfaction than the Junior Group; that is, the higher the rank, the greater the
satisfaction with the military.
All but one respondent did not know their exact retirement benefits; they only
had a general level of knowledge. Therefore, they perceived the retirement benefits to
be less than the actual value. A majority of respondents want to serve for 20 years or
longer and desire to receive a retirement annuity.
Present pay policies are not satisfactory to a proportion (44.8%) of all
respondents. They feel that their total pay is not equitable to their civilian counterpart
doing the same type of work. By groups, the Junior Group indicated their pay to be















VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5
2 n 16.2 16.2 17.6
3 35 51.5 51.5 69.1
4 19 27.9 27.9 97.1
5 2 2.9 2.9 100.0



















VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
TOTAL
1 2 2.9 2.9 2.9
2 15 22.1 22.1 25.0
3 29 42.6 42.6 67.6
4 22 32.4 32.4 100.0
68 100.0 100.0
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value frequency percent percent percent
1 5 7.4 7.4 7.4
2 18 26.5 26.5 33.3
3 19 27.9 27.9 61 .3
4 19 27.9 27.9 39.7
5 7 10.3 10.3 100.0
TOTAL 63 100.0 100.0
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1 4 5.9 5.9 5.9
2 s 7.4 7.4 13.2
3 24 35.3 35.3 43.5
4 27 39.7 39.7 38.2
5 3 11.3 11 .3 100.0
TOTAL 68 100.0 100.




















Figure 3.16 Civilian Job Search, (cont'd.)
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PROMOTION COMPARISON
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VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
TOTAL
1 1 1.5 1.S 1.5
2 3 11.3 11 .3 13.2
3 26 38.2 38.2 51 .5
4 31 45.6 45.6 97.1
5 2 2.9 2.9 100.0
68 100.0 100.0
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VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 5 7.4 7.4 7.4
2 14 20.6 20.6 27.9
3 36 52.9 S2.9 30.9
4 13 19.1 19.1 100.0
TOTAL 63 100.0 100.0
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VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 9 13.2 13.2 13.2
2 11 16.2 16.2 29.4
3 16 23.5 23.5 52.9
4 29 42.6 42.6 95.6
5 3 4.4 4.4 100.0













Figure 3.16 Civilian Job Search, (cont'd.)
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Respondents indicated that they expected some difficulty in finding a civilian job
at discharge, but fifty of the respondents indicated that they could use their skills in the
civilian sector with a probability of .5. Positive job conditions to the military were
important to the career officer in deciding to remain in the military. Obviously, the
degree to which and the condition in which the military officer's expectations are filled
will determine the degree of positive behavior and productivity of the individuals to our
military organization.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research has examined current military compensation policies with a view
toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for
the Korean career officer corps in the early 21st Century.
Through literature searches, privately-obtained data, and a survey of Korean
officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School, significant amounts of relevant data
were collected. This analysis is directed toward determination of compensation policy
changes that are necessary to insure the Korean military attracts and maintains the
right quantity and quality of career officer personnel needed in future years.
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our comparison of military and civilian pay policies and practices highlighted
several differences. Foremost was the difference between the two sectors in their use of
market "supply and demand" in deciding compensation policies. Whereas the civilian
sector emphasizes a market approach, it is clear that the military still bases the
majority of its compensation decisions on institutional grounds. Nonetheless, it also is
clear that the military is ever-increasingly relying on market approach considerations,
as it faces the difficult task of manning the career ranks of the armed forces in an
increasingly competitive marketplace.
Another difference between the military and civilian sectors is the level of pay for
university-educated professionals. While career military officers receive greater
allowances and special pays overall, it is clear the pay received by like-qualified
professionals in the civilian economy is significantly higher. Further, this pay disparity
differs for different occupations and is most apparent in the years immediately
following graduation.
After 10 or more years of military service or civilian work experience, however,
the disparity tends to disappear. Accordingly, for purposes of defining the target
group for possible compensation policy changes, it is clear the period between the end
of obligatory duty and 10 years of service is the most critical and deserving of
attention.
To provide the military with adequate numbers and quality of career officers
within this target area, the author believes that changes in the current compensation
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policies will be necessary and the military will be required to reflect a much greater
emphasis on "supply and demand" considerations in their compensation policy
considerations. Specifically, the author believes that compensation increases, directed
to the shortage skill areas, will be required. However, the author believes that desired
improvements in retention can be achieved if these compensation increases were
granted in the form of adjustments in allowances rather than across-the-board increases
in basic pay. Using changes in allowances rather than basic pay would offer two
advantages: it would allow the Korean military to target pay more toward specific skill
problem areas, and it would avoid the long-term cost implications that an across-the-
board pay increase creates in terms of retirement costs and other public employee
salary levels. Accordingly, the author recommends that the Korean military gives
serious consideration to increasing the authority for the payment of allowances to
career military officers with between 3 and 10 years of service. Further, the author
recommends that such authority allows military managers to vary the amounts of
increases in accordance with developing specific-skill retention problems. In addition,
the author recommends the added allowances only be paid when manpower analysts
determine that manning problems are about to occur. Finally, the author recommends
that the added allowances be paid only temporarily, for the duration of the manning
problem. In this way, a limited amount of added compensation funds can be used to
counter career officer retention problems in the most efficient way.
Another difference between military and civilian pay policies that merits
discussion concerns promotion. In the military, the emphasis for promotion is on
years of service. In the civilian sector, performance, rather than seniority, appears to
be the most critical factor. In the author's view, the military policy is not prompting
the level of sacrifice that is apparent in the civilian sector, and the author believes that
if a greater emphasis was placed on performance and a somewhat less emphasis was
placed on years of service, individual productivity would increase. Accordingly, the
author recommends that Korea military officers give serious consideration to amending
promotion standards, with greater emphasis placed on performance and a somewhat
lesser emphasis placed on years of service. Following this policy change, it would be
important for the Korean military to fully and completely explain the new standards to
all impacted military personnel.
Yet another difference between the Korean military and civilian sector concerns
the relative value and transferability of the skills obtained in service or employment.
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Whereas many young officers will leave the military in order to obtain civilian jobs,
many other high-quality officers, who may have entered the military with that
intention, will decide to stay. As a result, the military benefits from retaining high
quality career personnel. As some portion of all entering officer classes will remain in
the military, it is in the best interest of the military to insure that entering classes are of
the highest quality, and an officer's knowledge of skill marketability will aid in
achieving this goal. Accordingly, the author recommends that efforts be expended to
publicize and inform potential officer candidates about the civilian job implications of
military officer service.
The results of the survey of Korean officer students at the Naval Postgraduate
School supports these conclusions and recommendations. For example:
1. The survev demonstrated that a military member's perceptions of compensation
policies arid areas for constructive changes can be obtained and quantified.
2. Because of the perceived gap with civilian wage levels, respondents expressed
dissatisfaction with their basic pay and allowances.
3. However, they viewed policies concerning bonuses and supplemental benefits as
more acceptable.
4. They identified many pluses and negatives of military services.
5. Respondents believe that the current pay svstem, with its lower basic pav line in
relation to civilian pay. relies heavily on bonus and supplemental benefits, like
deferred income, and does not provide a strong incentive to long term career
commitment by nigh qualified young officers.
6. Respondents did not know exactly how much they received. It would be useful
for the military to better explain their compensation policies and the results of
compensation comparisons between the military and civilian sector.
7. One of the most frequently cited causes of discontent in the military was job
dissatisfaction. The survey showed that dissatisfaction with job conditions
affected the decision that the young officer, especially graduates of civilian
universities, is faced with when asked the question "stay in or get out".
B. SUMMARY
Through the survey analysis, various manpower approaches were identified that
could be used to tap the maximum potential of available human resources in relation
to the emerging problem of recruiting and retaining high quality people. Further, it
would be useful if, on a yearly basis, the Korean military would survey pay differentials
between military and civilians and then use the data when considering constructive
compensation policy changes. Clearly, this would allow explicit pay standards that are
more timely and accurate, and a more finely adjusted basic pay schedule could result.
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Also, the Korean military should continue to compare civilian pay and military
pay based on total compensation, considering all pay and fringe benefits, and publicize
the results in order to change the civilian perception of the military's pay and benefits
and provide military personnel and prospective candidates with a better understanding
of military compensation.
Finally, the Korean military commanders and manpower managers should strive
to remove as many of the undesirable job conditions that currently exist, thereby
attracting higher quality young officers.
As the Korean economy steadily strengthens, the Korean military must find the
most efficient and effective way to increase total combat readiness in order to deter
North Korean forces. Manpower and weapon resources management will be essential
in maintaining the combat edge.
In the 21st Century, the Korean military will be faced with lower manpower
ceilings, while requiring high skilled officers and enlisted personnel to operate the
technically advanced weapon systems acquired. The recruitment and retention of high
quality personnel is essential.
Adoption of the compensation policy changes recommended herein could help
the Korean military to overcome these problems in the most efficient way possible.
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2 167300 184400 240000 295700 356000 407900
3 177300 194900 252600 310100 371100 422600
4 205400 265200 324500 386200 437300
5 215900 277800 338900 401300 452000
6 226400 290400 353300 416400 466700
7 236900 303000 367700 431500 481400
8 315600 382100 446600 496100
9 328200 396500 461700 510800
10 340800 410900 476800 525500
11 353400 425300 491900 540200
12 366000 439700 507000 554900
13 454100 522100 569600




GUIDE FOR ALLOWANCES PAY
1. GENERAL ALLOWANCES
a. Quarter Allowances
All active officers receive this allowance four times per year.
The amount is figured out like this:
QTR Allowance = (£ Basic Pay paid at the end of every fiscal Quarter)/3
b. Semiannual Allowances
All active duty officers receive this allowance two times per year. The amount
starts 50 percent of Basic Pay for their pay grade, incremental increase 5 percent of 50
percent untill 100 percent.
c. Family Allowance
During their years of active duty, military personnel receive a supplement
corresponding to the number of children they have.
d. Long term Continuation Allowance
All officers differ on this allowance depending on years of service.
e. Housing Allowance
0-3 to 0-5 who are off base residents, that is, live in a civilian house, receive
the same amount of money.
f. Activity Allowance
All officers except 0-2 and O-l receive this allowance depending on Rank.
2. SPECIAL DUTY ALLOWANCES
a. Allowance for hazardous duty
Criteria : Rank and YOS. Recipient : Demolition duty officer, Parachute duty
officer and Electric technician who work in 3300 V.
b. Flight Allowance
Criteria : Rank and Aircraft type. Recipient : Jet, Prop and Hel pilot,
Navigator, Airborne mechanic, Navigator and Weaponoperator, Flight mdical officer.
c. Technical Allowance
Criteria : Rank and YOS. Recipient : Aircraft mechanic, Electronic
Technician, Vehicle Maintenance mechanic, Air traffic controller, Computer
programmer.
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d. Allowance for Legal/ Medical/ Religious officer
Criteria : Speciality. Recipient : All Legal, Medical, Religious officer
e. Allowance for Instructor
Criteria : Academy, AFTS, AF college and YOS. Recipient : Instructor in
criteria institution.
f. Allowance for Isolated duty
Criteria : Service and work in DMZ and Sea duty or isolated area. Recipient
: Only no n- officer
g. Incentive Allowance for Speciality
Criteria : Those who continue to remain in military after sacred duty.





1. In what services are you serving?
O Army O Navy O Marine Corps O Air Force
2. What is your present rank?
Rank O 01 O 02 O 03 O 04 O 05 O 06
3. Through which of the following officer procurement programs did you obtain your
commission?
O Academy Graduate
O 2nd Academy Graduate
O ROTC / University
O Other
4. To the nearest year and month, how long have you been on active duty? Count time
spent at prior enlisted service.
O 0-2 O 3-5 O 6-8 O 9-11 O 12-15 O GT 16
5. How old were you on your last birthday?
O 24-27 O 28-31 O 32-35 O 36-39
6. What is your marital status NOW?
O Married O Single,never married O Other
II. MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
7. Do you know what your retirement benefit will be?
O Not at all O Generally O Specifically
8. If you had a choice, which military retirement pay would you choose?
O lump-sum O Annuity O Other( specify)
9. When you finally leave the military, how many total years of service do you expect
to have?
O LT 15 O 16-19 O 20-23
O 24-27 O 28-31 O 32-33
10. When you finally leave the military, what rank do you think you will have? (Mark
one)
OFFICER GRADES
O 04 O 05 O 06 O 07
O 08 O 09 O 010
III. MILITARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
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11. To what extent is your total pay equitable to your civilian counterpart doing the
same type of work?
O To a very little extent
O To a little extent
O To a some extent
O To a great extent
O To a very great extent
12. Considering your present compensation and duty assignment, do you feel that your
compensation is:
Dissatisfied Satisfied






2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
13. If vou had authority to change Korean Military Pay Policies for one of the above
five categories of compensation,
A. What category would you change?
Specify( )
B. Why would you make this change?
specify( )
14. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with medical care in the military?
Dissatisfied Satisfied
12 3 4 5 6 7
15. In what type of housing did you live at previous duty station in KOREA? (Mark
one)
O I lived in civilian housing.
O I lived in military housing.
16. Which of the following best describes your main reason for living in civilian
housing? (Mark one)
O I was not eligible to live in military housing.
O I was waiting to be assinged to military housing
O Military housing was not available.
O I preferred civilian housing.
O I had other reasons.
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O I lived in military housing.
IV. CIVILIAN JOB SEARCH
17. If you were to leave the service NOW and try to find a civilian job, how likely
would vou be to find a GOOD CIVILIAN JOB? (Mark one)
;0 in 10) No chance
[1 in 10) Very slight possibility
Oi[2 in 10) Slight possibility
[3 in 10) Some possibility
o ,4 in 10) Fair possibility
o [5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
[6 in 10) Good possibility
o '7 in 10) Probable
;8 in 10) Very probable
Oi[9 in 10) Almost sure
Oi;i0 in 10) Certain
Don t know
18. Suppose vou were to leave the service NOW and try to find a civilian job. How
likelv would vou be to find a civilian job that uses the SKILLS IN YOUR MILITARY
CAREER FIELD?
o< in 10) No chance
Ol I in 10) Very slight possibility
Oi 2 in 10) Slight possibility
Oi 3 in 10) Some possibility
Oi'4 in 10) Fair possibility
Oi;5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
Oi,6 in 10) Good possibility
Oi7 in 10) Probable
O ,8 in 10) Very probable
O [9 in 10) Almost sure
O ;i0in 10) Certain
O Don't know
19. If vou were to leave the service NOW and take a civilian job, how do vou think
that job would compare with your last military job in Korea in regard to the'following
work conditions?
1 : Civilian job would be a lot better.
2 : Civilian job would be slightly better.
3 : About the same in a civilian and military job.
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1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
4 : Civilian job would be slightly worse.
5 : Civilian job would be a lot worse.
The immediate supervisors
Having a say in what happens to me
The retirement benefits
The medical benefits
The change for interesting and
challenging work
The wage or salaries
The chance for promotion
The people work with
The work schedule and hours of work
The job security
The equipment I would use on the job
The location of job
WE'VE COVERED A LOT OF DIFFERENT TOPICS IN THIS SURVEY.NOW,
THERE ARE SOME QUESTIONS ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT.
20. Think for a minute about other militarv personnel who have the same total years of
service that you have. Which of the following statements best describes when vou
expect your next promotion?
O EARLIER than most people who have the same total years of service.
O AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME as most people who have the same total years
of service.
O LATER than most people who have the same total years of service.
21. Below are a number of reasons officer candidates may have had for joining the
military'. Which items were the most important to you? Rank your selection in order
of your priority.
1. Pride of serving in Armed Forces
2. Camaraderie









22. Taking all things together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are vou with the military as








THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
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APPENDIX D
STATISTICS DATA OF SURVEY RESULTS
Ql RESPONDENTS BY BRANCH OF SERVICE







































MEAN 3.206 STD DEV






















TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0


























TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0




































































2.515 STD DEV .680
RESPONDENTS BY MARTIAL STATUS
100.0 100.0
MEDIAN








1.088 STD DEV .286






































EXPECTED YOS AT DISCHARGE






















































































































































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV 1.161 MEDIAN 3.000































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV .855 MEDIAN 3.000









































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV 1.425 MEDIAN 3.000MEAN 3 . 294











VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 2 2.9 2.9 2.9
2 1 1.5 1.5 4.4
3 10 14.7 14.7 19.1
4 13 19.1 19.1 38.2
5 13 19.1 19.1 57.4
6 14 20.6 20.6 77.9
7 15 22.1 22.1 100.0
TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV 1.583 MEDIAN 5.000










E FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 15 22.1 22.1 22.1
2 10 14.7 14.7 36.8
3 21 30.9 30.9 67.6
4 13 19.1 19.1 86.8
5 7 10.3 10.3 97.1
6 1 1.5 1.5 98.5














TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV 1.422 MEDIAN 3.000









































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV 1.963 MEDIAN 3.000




































































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0





































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
STD DEV 1.393 MEDIAN 3.000
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Q15 TYPES OF HOUSING

















TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 1.618 STD DEV .490 MEDIAN 2.000
H6 REASON FOR CHOOSING CIVILIAN HOUSING



































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 4.868 STD DEV 1.554 MEDIAN 6.000
il7 PROBABILITY OF FINDING A CIV, . JOB















































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 3.779 STD DEV 1.819 MEDIAN 3.000
























































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0








































MEAN 3.,147 STD DEV .778 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19B DECISION PARTICIPATION COMPARIOSN

































MEAN 3.,044 STD DEV .818 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19C RETIREMENT BENEFIT COMPARISON












































MEAN 3.,074 STD DEV 1 .124 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19D MEDICAL BENEFIT COMPARISON







































MEAN 3.,441 STD DEV .998 MEDIAN 4.000
Q19E CHANCE FOR CHALLENGE COMPARISON

































MEAN 2.,382 STD DEV .847 MEDIAN 2.000
Q19F WAGES AND SALARIES COMPARIOSN
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TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 2. 235 STD DEV .831 MEDIAN 2.000
Q19G PROMOTION COMPARISON



































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 3. 324 STD DEV .818 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19H TRAINING OPPORTUNITY COMPARISON



































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 3. 368 STD DEV .790 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19I COWORKER RELATION COMPARISON





























TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 2
.
838 STD DEV .822 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19J WORK SCHEDULE COMPARISON



































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
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MEAN 2.647 STD DEV









































































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 3.,088 STD DEV 1.143 MEDIAN 3.000
Q19L FACILITIES /EQUP. COMPARISON





























TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 2
,
,309 STD DEV .885 MEDIAN 2.000
Q19M LOCATION COMPARISON





























TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 1,,985 STD DEV .819 MEDIAN 2.000
Q20 PROMOTION PROSPECTS

































OTHER 1.5 1.5 100.0
"
TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 3.926 STD DEV 2 .294 MEDIAN 4.000
22 SATISFACTION WITH MIL. LIFE















































TOTAL 68 100.0 100.0
MEAN 4.853 STD DEV 1 .319 MEDIAN 5.000
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APPENDIX E






ROW PCT IA VERY L A LITTLE A SOME A GREAT A VERY G ROW
IITTLE REAT TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51
+ +
1.00 I 31 11 I 91 I II 24
I 12.5 I 45.8 I 37.5 I I 4.2 I 35.3
+ + + + + +
2.00 I 51 14 I 20 I 51 I 44
I 11.4 I 31.8 I 45.5 I 11.4 I I 64.7
+ + +
8 25 29 5 1COLUMN
TOTAL 11.8 36.8 42.6 7.4 1.5
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100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5






ROW PCT IVERY DIS DISSATIS SLIGHTLY SO-SO
ISATISFIE FIED DISSATI








SLIGHLTL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW
Y SATISF D ISFIEO TOTAL
41 51 61 71






























































SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
1.35902 6 0.9683 0.353
Q12B
COUNT I
ROW PCT IVERY DIS DISSATIS SLIGHTLY SO-SO
ISATISFIE FIED DISSATI




SLIGHLTL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW



























I 61 71 71 11 I 12 I 44
























ROW PCT IVERY DIS DISSATIS SLIGHTLY SO-SO
8 OF 14 ( 57. IX)
SLIGHLTL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW
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ISATISFIE FIED DISSATI Y SATISF D ISFIED TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51 61 71
Q2X + + + + + + + +
1.00 I 31 51 71 4 1 31 II II 24
JUNIOR I 12.5 I 20.8 I 29.2 I 16.7 I 12.5 I 4.2 I 4.2 I 35.3
+ + + + + + + +
2.00 I 12 I 51 14 I 91 41 I I 44
SENIOR I 27.3 I 11.4 I 31.8 I 20.5 I 9.1 I I I 64.7
+ + + + + + + +
COLUMN 15 10 21 13 7 1 1 68
TOTAL 22.1 14.7 30.9 19.1 10.3 1.5 1.5 100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS NITH E.F.< 5
6.47723 6 0.3719 0.353 8 OF 14 ( 57. IX)
Q12D
COUNT I
ROW PCT IVERY DIS DISSATIS SLIGHTLY SO-SO SLIGHLTL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW
ISATISFIE FIED DISSATI Y SATISF D ISFIED TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51 61 71
Q2X + + + + + + + +
1.00 I 31 41 81 61 I 21 II 24
JUNIOR I 12.5 I 16.7 I 33.3 I 25.0 I I 8.3 I 4.2 I 35.3
+ + + + + + + +
2.00 I 81 61 91 51 31 51 81 44
SENIOR I 18.2 I 13.6 I 20.5 I 11.4 I 6.8 I 11.4 I 18.2 I 64.7
+ + + + + + +
COLUMN 11 10 17 11 3 7 9 68
TOTAL 16.2 14.7 25.0 16.2 4.4 10.3 13.2 100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
7.30192 6 0.2938 1.059
Q12E
COUNT I










8 OF 14 ( 57. IX)
SLIGHLTL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW

















































CHI-SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
3.63182 0.7264 0.706 7 OF 14 ( 50. OX)
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APPENDIX F
CROSSTABULATION OF Q19 BY SERVICE
Q19A
COUNT I
1WW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY A LOT WO ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE RSE TOTAL
11
I 11 21 31 41 i51
11







50.0 I 34.4 I I
- +
47.1
2 I I 1 I 8 I 2 I 1 I 12
NAVY I I 8.3 I 66.7 I 16.7 I 8.3 I 17.6
3 I 1 I 5 I 11 I 6 I 1 I 24
AIR FORCE I 4. 2 I 20.8 I 45.8 I 25.0 I 4.2 I 35.3
COLUMN 1 11 35 19 2 68
TOTAL 1. 5 16.2 51.5 27.9 2.9 100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F.
8
SIGNIFICANC E fUN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
6.66172 0. 5735 CM76 9 OF 15 ( 60. OX)
Q19B
COUNT I
1WW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE TOTAL
ii
I 11 21 31 41
11
1 I I 9 I 14 I 9 I 32
ARMY I I 28.1 I 43.8 I 28.1 I 47.1











3 I 2 I 3 I 9 I 10 I 24
AIR FORCE I 8. 3 I 12.5 I 37.5 I 41.7 I 35.3
COLUMN 2 15 29 22 68
TOTAL 2. 9 22.1 42.6 32.4 100.0
CHI -SQUARE O.F SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
6.57284 6 0.3622 0.353 5 OF 12 ( 41.7/C)
Q19C
COUNT I
ROM PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY A LOT WO ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE RSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51
II 41 51 81 12 I 31 32
ARMY I 12.5 I 15.6 I 25.0 I 37.5 I 9.4 I 47.1
f + + + + +
21 I 51 31 II 3 1 12
NAVY I I 41.7 I 25.0 I 8.3 I 25.0 I 17.6
+ + + + « +31 II 81 81 61 II 24
AIR FORCE I 4.2 I 33.3 I 33.3 I 25.0 I 4.2 I 35.3
+ + + + + +
COLUMN 5 18 19 19 7 68
TOTAL 7.4 26.5 27.9 27.9 10.3 100.0
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1 1 1 I 13 I 11 I 6
3.1 1 3.1 I 40.6 I 34.4 I 18.8
2 ] 2 I 1 I 5 I 2
16.7 1 16.7 I 8.3 I 41.7 I 16.7
1 ] 2 I 10 I 11 I











CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
12.99987 8 0.1119 0.706 11 OF
Q19E
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41
Ql + + + +
II II 19 I 61 61 32
ARMY I 3.1 I 59.4 I 18.8 I 18.8 I 47.1
+ + + +
21 21 71 31 I 12
NAVY I 16.7 I 58.3 I 25.0 I I 17.6
+ + + + +
31 41 11 I 61 31 24
AIR FORCE I 16.7 I 45.8 I 25.0 I 12.5 I 35.3
COLUMN 7 37 15 9 68
TOTAL 10.3 54.4 22.1 13.2 100.0
15 ( 73. 3X)
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
6.15457 6 0.4061 1.235 7 OF
Q19F
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41
qi ;. , i——+— + + + +
II 41 20 I 41 41 32
ARMY I 12.5 I 62.5 I 12.5 I 12.5 I 47.1
+__ + + + +
21 21 91 I II 12
NAVY I 16.7 I 75.0 I I 8.3 I 17.6
+ + + + +
31 31 13 I 51 31 24
AIR FORCE I 12.5 I 54.2 I 20.8 I 12.5 I 35.3
+ + + + +
COLUMN 9 42 9 8 68
TOTAL 13.2 61.8 13.2 11.8 100.0
12 ( 58. 3X)




7452 1 .412 9 OF 12 ( 75. OX
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY A LOT WO ROW































1 7 3 1 12
NAVY I I 8.3 I 58.3 I 25.0 I 8.3 I 17.6
3 I 1 I 5 I 11 I 7 I I 24
AIR FORCE I 4.2 I 20.8 I 45.8 I 29.2 I I 35.3
COLUMN 1 8 31 24 4 68
TOTAL 1.5 11.8 45.6 35.3 5.9 100.0
CHI-SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
8.52094 8 0.3843 0.176 10 OF 15 ( 66. 77.)
Q19H
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY A LOT WO ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE RSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51
qi + + + + + +
II II 41 11 I 16 I I 32
ARMY I 3.1 I 12.5 I 34.4 I 50.0 I I 47.1
+ + + + + +
21 I I 61 41 2 1 12
NAVY I I I 50.0 I 33.3 I 16.7 I 17.6
+ + + + + +
31 I 41 91 11 I I 24
AIR FORCE I I 16.7 I 37.5 I 45.8 I I 35.3
+ + 4 + + +
COLUMN 1 8 26 31 2 68
TOTAL 1.5 11.8 38.2 45.6 2.9 100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
13.46975 8 0.0967 0.176 10 OF
Q19I
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41
QI 4 4 4 4 4
II 21 91 15 I 61 32
ARMY I 6.3 I 28.1 I 46.9 I 18.8 I 47.1
4 + 4 + +
21 I 21 71 31 12
NAVY I I 16.7 I 58.3 I 25.0 I 17.6
+______ 4 4 4 4
31 31 31 14 I 41 24
AIR FORCE I 12.5 I 12.5 I 58.3 I 16.7 I 35.3
4 4 4 4 4
COLUMN 5 14 36 13 68
TOTAL 7.4 20.6 52.9 19.1 100.0
15 ( 66. 77.)
CHI-SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5




ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY A LOT WO ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE RSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51
Ql + + + + + +
II 4 I 14 I 91 51 I 32
ARMY I 12.5 I 43.8 I 28.1 I 15.6 I I 47.1
+ + + + + +21 II 21 31 41 21 12
NAVY I 8.3 I 16.7 I 25.0 I 33.3 I 16.7 I 17.6
+ + + + + +31 61 71 41 61 II 24
AIR FORCE I 25.0 I 29.2 I 16.7 I 25.0 I 4.2 I 35.3
+ + + + + +
COLUMN 11 23 16 15 3 68
TOTAL 16.2 33.8 23.5 22.1 4.4 100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
11.67397 8 0.1664 0.529 8 OF 15 ( 53.3/J)
Q19K
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY A LOT NO ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE RSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41 51
Ql + + + + +
II 21 71 61 16 I II 32
ARMY I 6.3 I 21.9 I 18.8 I 50.0 I 3.1 I 47.1
+ + + + + +
21 I II 41 61 II 12
NAVY I I 8.3 I 33.3 I 50.0 I 8.3 I 17.6
+ + + + + +31 71 31 61 71 II 24
AIR FORCE I 29.2 I 12.5 I 25.0 I 29.2 I 4.2 I 35.3
+ + + + + +
COLUMN 9 11 16 29 3 68
TOTAL 13.2 16.2 23.5 42.6 4.4 100.0
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
11.61465 8 0.1692 0.529 9 OF
Q19L
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY ROW
ITTER BETTER WORSE TOTAL
I II 21 31 41
Ql + + + +
II 61 18 I 51 31 32
ARMY I 18.8 I 56.3 I 15.6 I 9.4 I 47.1
+ + +
21 I 21 61 41 12
NAVY I I 16.7 I 50.0 I 33.3 I 17.6
+ + + + +31 51 13 I 51 II 24
AIR FORCE I 20.8 I 54.2 I 20.8 I 4.2 I 35.3
- — + + +
COLUMN 11 33 16 8 68
TOTAL 16.2 48.5 23.5 11.8 100.0
15 ( 60.0/:)
CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
16.03007 6 0.0136 1.412 6 OF
Q19M
COUNT I
ROW PCT IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME SLIGHLY ROM




































I 5 1 II
I 15.6 I 3.1 I
14 1 I
I 33.3 I I
--+ + +
I 4 1 2 1

















CHI -SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
4.70815 0.5818 0.529 6 OF 12 ( 50. OX)
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